What’s War For?
On Combat and Outcomes
A guest article by ForTheCommonDefense:
War isn’t all about killing. Leaders send their citizens to fight in furtherance of political goals—combat is merely a means to an end. This isn’t a pedantic distinction; it has profound implications for how politicians, fighting men, and the public should think about war. Tactical excellence is useless when paired with unsound strategy. From the foxhole to the situation room, everyone must understand why they’re fighting and why it will (or will not) work. When these go uninterrogated, nations lose wars.
From the greatest superpowers to the smallest insurgencies, all political entities seek security, prosperity, and autonomy. Unfortunately, these common goals often drive conflict. Except for in cases of total war or extermination, all conflict is a negotiation. When two parties want the same thing (say, a piece of contested land) or mutually exclusive things (perhaps one seeks conquest and the other independence), the bargaining begins. Each party will pursue policies to entice or coerce the other into giving up what's at stake. Enticement offers value to an opposing party in exchange for the stake. Preferential trade deals, investments, bribes, or a promise to compromise on other issues are examples of enticement. Coercion imposes or threatens to impose pain on an opposing party to convince them to abandon the stake. Economic sanctions, blockades, and war are all coercive measures. When Clausewitz wrote that “war is policy by other means,” he meant that combat is merely another tool available to the statesman to secure national interests. Wars are conducted to settle disagreements, not to defeat armies.
Unless the combatants can physically seize what's at stake, a war must end with a negotiated agreement. The American Civil War and World War II are popular examples of total war, but these only ended after the vanquished agreed to lay down arms. Even so-called “unconditional surrender” is a choice—a choice not to fight to the last. A conflict will continue until the enemy agrees that he’s been beaten; a sound strategy is one which can persuade him it's best to give up. This requires more than destroying equipment, killing personnel, and otherwise causing pain. It requires the strategist to understand how outcomes on the battlefield will change the enemy’s value calculus. If an adversary would rather keep fighting, he will.
Take for example the ongoing war in Iran. There is no doubt that American soldiers, sailors, and airmen have outclassed their adversary. U.S. forces have ravaged Iran’s air force, sunk its navy, and dealt heavy blows to its military and political leadership. But has Washington secured any of its wartime objectives? The war failed not because American servicemen dealt insufficient damage, but because there was no plan for how damage might accomplish anything. The Iranians find America’s proposed terms to be unacceptable and our promises to be untrustworthy—they’d rather be bombed than accept what we’re offering.
This does not mean that combat does not matter; of course it does. Nations’ destinies have rested on an individual soldier’s determination to hold the line. But it does mean that on all levels, war should be about achieving outcomes. Successful strategists understand how every engagement, operation, and campaign will get them closer to whatever goal justified warfare in the first place. Very rarely are enemy dead that ultimate goal.
Some say the conduct of war should not be politicized. They are wrong. What is possible, what is worthwhile, and what will work are deeply political questions that must be answered to craft sound strategy. Remember, warfare is only ever a means to an end. If popular opinion or fear of escalation or rules of engagement get “in the way” of combat, then that combat is ill-suited for the task at hand. What works against an armored division won’t work on guerrillas; what might repel an invader might not secure a nuclear deal. All too often, leaders assume more force will lead to better outcomes; without a coherent theory of victory, it will not.
By appreciating the abstract purpose of war, conflict becomes much easier to read. Before a fight even begins, one can take stock of the belligerents' demands, motivations, and coercive mechanisms. A mismatch in determination or planning is often as decisive as an imbalance in military capability. When physical seizure of the stake is impossible and a negotiated outcome is unlikely, conflict will drag on. Political leaders who focus solely on attrition are unlikely to realize their aims. These basic theoretical deductions will forecast outcomes more accurately than any pundit. Intentional strategy is a precondition for victory.
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